Part Two:
Australian PM Outlines
Indefinite Military Agenda
In South Pacific
[www.wsws.org]
The region’s natural resources now help fuel China’s ongoing industrial expansion. Papua New Guinea, for example, was China’s second largest source of logs in 2005, behind Russia, and 80 percent of PNG’s log exports go to China. One of China’s largest overseas investment projects, the Ramu nickel mine, is located in PNG. Opened late last year, the mine was developed by China’s Metallurgical Construction Corp after Beijing reached a $US915 million financing agreement with the PNG government. The investment was directly driven by a shortage of raw materials for China’s stainless steel industry.
The Beijing bureaucracy is investing considerable resources in its diplomatic relations with the South Pacific countries. China now has more diplomats in the region than any other country, and Pacific leaders visiting Beijing are granted lavish receptions. While there are no official figures available, Chinese aid to the South Pacific is estimated at more than $A300 million annually—a sum nearly twice the total gross domestic product of the three poorest nations in the region (Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu). Much of Beijing’s aid is devoted to prominent “prestige projects”—sports stadiums in Fiji and Samoa, a parliamentary complex in Vanuatu, and new foreign ministry headquarters in PNG—and unlike Australian aid money, Chinese funding does not require Pacific governments to fulfil “good governance” and other obligations.
Several American and Australian foreign policy analysts have warned of the long-term strategic implications of China’s growing influence. In World War II, the US was forced to wage a series of bloody battles against the Japanese to secure control of the Pacific Islands. After the war, US authorities considered the entire Pacific Ocean to be an “American lake”. In partnership with allies such as Australia, Washington’s intent was to maintain exclusive control and prevent any potential adversaries from gaining a foothold in the strategically significant region.
Dominance
Stratfor, an American security and intelligence think tank, has warned that, “China’s need to counter American power - combined with Beijing’s limited naval capability - makes a Pacific Island strategy as natural to them as it was to the Japanese decades ago.” Stratfor raised the prospect of Beijing attempting to counter US naval dominance by stationing missiles in South Pacific countries. “While Beijing is unlikely to deploy forces to the South Pacific soon, its relationships with the island nations offer it a strategic tool to counter US naval power in Asia. The Chinese military has paid great attention to the development of shore-based anti-ship missile systems it eventually could deploy throughout the South Pacific and Southeast Asia.”
The US has already made clear its unwillingness to allow any erosion of its military position in the Pacific. Washington paid considerable attention to a satellite tracking station constructed by the Chinese government in Kiribati in 1997. While Beijing insisted the station was only used for scientific and commercial purposes, the Bush administration alleged that it was being used to develop a Chinese space warfare program and also spy on the US military’s missile testing facility in the neighbouring Marshall Islands. This facility is vital for the development of the Bush administration’s Strategic Defence Initiative (“Son of Star Wars”) missile defence system. The Chinese tracking station was shut down in 2004 after Kiribati’s government recognised Taipei. Although never proven, Washington was widely believed to have been involved in behind-the-scenes manoeuvres encouraging the diplomatic switch.
Canberra fears Beijing’s growing influence in the South Pacific for a number of reasons. China’s increasing commercial ties—particularly its aggressive pursuit of oil, gas, minerals, timber, and fishing investments—threatens corporate Australia’s dominant position in the exploitation of the region’s natural resources. Canberra’s foreign policy establishment is also hostile to Beijing and Taipei’s aid and trade rivalry, which it considers a threat to its efforts to cultivate compliant pro-Australian regimes in the Pacific states.
Beijing
Canberra’s alliance with Washington is a critical factor shaping the Howard government’s response to Beijing’s entry into the South Pacific. Bush has previously designated China as a “strategic competitor” and looks to Canberra to defend US interests in the region.
In the Sunday Telegraph interview, Howard explained, “That’s why we’ve been increasing the size of our army. It’s all designed to give us the capacity to deal with things in the region. And this is our responsibility. The rest of the world looks to us to do it, and the more we are able to play our part effectively here, the less is legitimately expected of us in other parts of the world. That’s not to say we won’t do other things, but if we can have an effective stabilising role in the whole Pacific region, I can assure you that is mightily important to the Americans and to our allies in Europe.”
The Howard government has unconditionally backed the Bush administration’s criminal interventions in the Middle East, dispatching troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq. In return, Washington has provided critical backing for Canberra’s operations in the Pacific. Underlying this quid pro quo is a convergence of interests, with the Howard government advancing its agenda in the region under the aegis of US imperialism’s claim to global hegemony. This is the essence of Howard’s self-proclaimed role of “deputy sheriff”.
Terror
The Bush administration’s so-called war on terror and its doctrine of “regime change” and pre-emptive war were the basis for the Howard government’s takeover of the Solomon Islands in 2003, when it dispatched hundreds of soldiers, police, and bureaucratic personnel to the tiny country. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was subsequently hailed as a model military-led intervention into a “failing state” that could be applied throughout the region. When announcing the expansion of the Australian military last year, Howard named Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Vanuatu as further potential targets.
The Bush administration has repeatedly expressed its appreciation of Canberra’s role. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was asked last month whether she was disappointed that Australian troops were not playing a more front-line role in Iraq. “I would never use the word disappointment in the same line with Australia,” she replied. “This is a country that, not only in Iraq, not only in Afghanistan, not only in tsunami relief, not only in support for all that we’re doing in the Asia Pacific, but also in taking really primary responsibility in places like the Solomon Islands, Fiji, East Timor, has put its resources and its assets at the disposal of peace and security in the region, and in the spread of freedom. And I just can’t think of a better friend and a better ally.”
Nevertheless, Canberra and Washington do not share identical positions in relation to Beijing. The Howard government has generally adopted a less belligerent stance than the Bush administration. This is due to the Australian ruling elite’s interest in maintaining its lucrative exports of natural resources such as gas, gold, iron ore, coal, and aluminium to China. These exports have been crucial for Australia’s economic growth - and Howard’s electoral successes -over the past decade. Canberra is currently seeking to negotiate a free trade deal with Beijing.
Despite these differences, the Howard government and the Bush administration agree that no potentially hostile power can be permitted to advance its strategic and economic interests in the South Pacific at their expense. That Howard abandoned his usual caution in the Telegraph interview and identified China as a rival indicates just how much is at stake.
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/jan2007/sep-j18.shtml
Indefinite Military Agenda
In South Pacific
[www.wsws.org]
The region’s natural resources now help fuel China’s ongoing industrial expansion. Papua New Guinea, for example, was China’s second largest source of logs in 2005, behind Russia, and 80 percent of PNG’s log exports go to China. One of China’s largest overseas investment projects, the Ramu nickel mine, is located in PNG. Opened late last year, the mine was developed by China’s Metallurgical Construction Corp after Beijing reached a $US915 million financing agreement with the PNG government. The investment was directly driven by a shortage of raw materials for China’s stainless steel industry.
The Beijing bureaucracy is investing considerable resources in its diplomatic relations with the South Pacific countries. China now has more diplomats in the region than any other country, and Pacific leaders visiting Beijing are granted lavish receptions. While there are no official figures available, Chinese aid to the South Pacific is estimated at more than $A300 million annually—a sum nearly twice the total gross domestic product of the three poorest nations in the region (Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu). Much of Beijing’s aid is devoted to prominent “prestige projects”—sports stadiums in Fiji and Samoa, a parliamentary complex in Vanuatu, and new foreign ministry headquarters in PNG—and unlike Australian aid money, Chinese funding does not require Pacific governments to fulfil “good governance” and other obligations.
Several American and Australian foreign policy analysts have warned of the long-term strategic implications of China’s growing influence. In World War II, the US was forced to wage a series of bloody battles against the Japanese to secure control of the Pacific Islands. After the war, US authorities considered the entire Pacific Ocean to be an “American lake”. In partnership with allies such as Australia, Washington’s intent was to maintain exclusive control and prevent any potential adversaries from gaining a foothold in the strategically significant region.
Dominance
Stratfor, an American security and intelligence think tank, has warned that, “China’s need to counter American power - combined with Beijing’s limited naval capability - makes a Pacific Island strategy as natural to them as it was to the Japanese decades ago.” Stratfor raised the prospect of Beijing attempting to counter US naval dominance by stationing missiles in South Pacific countries. “While Beijing is unlikely to deploy forces to the South Pacific soon, its relationships with the island nations offer it a strategic tool to counter US naval power in Asia. The Chinese military has paid great attention to the development of shore-based anti-ship missile systems it eventually could deploy throughout the South Pacific and Southeast Asia.”
The US has already made clear its unwillingness to allow any erosion of its military position in the Pacific. Washington paid considerable attention to a satellite tracking station constructed by the Chinese government in Kiribati in 1997. While Beijing insisted the station was only used for scientific and commercial purposes, the Bush administration alleged that it was being used to develop a Chinese space warfare program and also spy on the US military’s missile testing facility in the neighbouring Marshall Islands. This facility is vital for the development of the Bush administration’s Strategic Defence Initiative (“Son of Star Wars”) missile defence system. The Chinese tracking station was shut down in 2004 after Kiribati’s government recognised Taipei. Although never proven, Washington was widely believed to have been involved in behind-the-scenes manoeuvres encouraging the diplomatic switch.
Canberra fears Beijing’s growing influence in the South Pacific for a number of reasons. China’s increasing commercial ties—particularly its aggressive pursuit of oil, gas, minerals, timber, and fishing investments—threatens corporate Australia’s dominant position in the exploitation of the region’s natural resources. Canberra’s foreign policy establishment is also hostile to Beijing and Taipei’s aid and trade rivalry, which it considers a threat to its efforts to cultivate compliant pro-Australian regimes in the Pacific states.
Beijing
Canberra’s alliance with Washington is a critical factor shaping the Howard government’s response to Beijing’s entry into the South Pacific. Bush has previously designated China as a “strategic competitor” and looks to Canberra to defend US interests in the region.
In the Sunday Telegraph interview, Howard explained, “That’s why we’ve been increasing the size of our army. It’s all designed to give us the capacity to deal with things in the region. And this is our responsibility. The rest of the world looks to us to do it, and the more we are able to play our part effectively here, the less is legitimately expected of us in other parts of the world. That’s not to say we won’t do other things, but if we can have an effective stabilising role in the whole Pacific region, I can assure you that is mightily important to the Americans and to our allies in Europe.”
The Howard government has unconditionally backed the Bush administration’s criminal interventions in the Middle East, dispatching troops to both Afghanistan and Iraq. In return, Washington has provided critical backing for Canberra’s operations in the Pacific. Underlying this quid pro quo is a convergence of interests, with the Howard government advancing its agenda in the region under the aegis of US imperialism’s claim to global hegemony. This is the essence of Howard’s self-proclaimed role of “deputy sheriff”.
Terror
The Bush administration’s so-called war on terror and its doctrine of “regime change” and pre-emptive war were the basis for the Howard government’s takeover of the Solomon Islands in 2003, when it dispatched hundreds of soldiers, police, and bureaucratic personnel to the tiny country. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was subsequently hailed as a model military-led intervention into a “failing state” that could be applied throughout the region. When announcing the expansion of the Australian military last year, Howard named Papua New Guinea, Fiji, and Vanuatu as further potential targets.
The Bush administration has repeatedly expressed its appreciation of Canberra’s role. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was asked last month whether she was disappointed that Australian troops were not playing a more front-line role in Iraq. “I would never use the word disappointment in the same line with Australia,” she replied. “This is a country that, not only in Iraq, not only in Afghanistan, not only in tsunami relief, not only in support for all that we’re doing in the Asia Pacific, but also in taking really primary responsibility in places like the Solomon Islands, Fiji, East Timor, has put its resources and its assets at the disposal of peace and security in the region, and in the spread of freedom. And I just can’t think of a better friend and a better ally.”
Nevertheless, Canberra and Washington do not share identical positions in relation to Beijing. The Howard government has generally adopted a less belligerent stance than the Bush administration. This is due to the Australian ruling elite’s interest in maintaining its lucrative exports of natural resources such as gas, gold, iron ore, coal, and aluminium to China. These exports have been crucial for Australia’s economic growth - and Howard’s electoral successes -over the past decade. Canberra is currently seeking to negotiate a free trade deal with Beijing.
Despite these differences, the Howard government and the Bush administration agree that no potentially hostile power can be permitted to advance its strategic and economic interests in the South Pacific at their expense. That Howard abandoned his usual caution in the Telegraph interview and identified China as a rival indicates just how much is at stake.
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/jan2007/sep-j18.shtml
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